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Abstract. Submodularity (or concavity) is considered as an important
property in the ﬁeld of cooperative game theory. In this article, we char-
acterize submodular minimum coloring games and submodular minimum
vertex cover games. These characterizations immediately show that it can be
decided in polynomial time that the minimum coloring game or the minimum
vertex cover game on a given graph is submodular or not. Related to these
results, the Shapley values are also investigated.
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1 Introduction
In this article, we investigate minimum coloring games and minimum vertex
cover games. Generally, a cooperative game arising from a combinatorial
optimization problem is called a combinatorial optimization game, and so a
minimum coloring game and a minimum vertex cover game are examples of
combinatorial optimization games. Perhaps, the most classical combinatorial
optimization game is an assignment game by Shapley–Shubik [17], and since
then a lot of combinatorial optimization games have been introduced. See the
books [1, 3] for some aspects of combinatorial optimization games.
Particularly, some combinatorial optimization games are used to model
several situations concerning cost allocation. Here is an example. Consider a
company which operates a cellular telephone network. It has some trans-
mitters. Each transmitter covers the corresponding area (usually a disk
centered at the transmitter) and frequency bands will be assigned to each
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transmitter. Here, distinct frequency bands should be assigned to two
transmitters if they share an area. In the simplest assignment all the trans-
mitters have distinct frequency bands, but it costs high. By cooperating with
each other, they can reduce the cost. So now, the problem is how to allocate
the total cost to each transmitter. We consider this problem as a game-the-
oretic situation, and a minimum coloring game is one of the possible models
of the situation.
In this article, we discuss submodularity of the minimum coloring game
and the minimum vertex cover game. In the next section, we characterize
submodular minimum coloring games and submodular minimum vertex
cover games in terms of forbidden subgraphs. In Section 3, we give formulae
of the Shapley values for these games. In Section 4, we state the relationship
of our results with matroids.
2 Minimum coloring games, minimum vertex cover games
and submodularity
First we collect some terminology on graphs. If you have something missing,
see a textbook of graph theory (as Diestel [6]). In this article, all graphs are
ﬁnite and simple. For a graph G ¼ ðV ;EÞ, the vertex set V and the edge set E
are sometimes denoted as V ðGÞ and EðGÞ, respectively. For S  V ðGÞ, the
subgraph induced by S is denoted by G½S.
A vertex coloring (or simply a coloring) of G ¼ ðV ;EÞ is a function
c : V ! f1; . . . ; kg such that cðuÞ 6¼ cðvÞ for any adjacent vertices u; v 2 V .
For a coloring c : V ! f1; . . . ; kg, each element in f1; . . . ; kg is called a color,
and a vertex v 2 V is said to be colored by i 2 f1; . . . ; kg if cðvÞ ¼ i. A min-
imum coloring of G is a coloring c : V ! f1; . . . ; kg such that k is as small as
possible, and such k is called the chromatic number of G. The chromatic
number of G is denoted by vðGÞ. If G is the empty graph, i.e., G has no vertex,
we set vðGÞ ¼ 0.
A vertex cover of G ¼ ðV ;EÞ is a subset U  V such that every edge e 2 E
is incident with some vertex v 2 U , i.e., v 2 e. A minimum vertex cover of G is
a vertex cover U  V such that jU j  jU 0j for any vertex cover U 0  V . We
denote the size of a minimum vertex cover of G by sðGÞ. Note that sðGÞ ¼ 0 if
G has no edge.
A set S  V is called a clique of G ¼ ðV ;EÞ if G½S forms a complete graph
(i.e., any two vertices in G½S form an edge). A set S  V is called a stable set
of G if G½S has no edge.
Now we introduce a cooperative game.
A cooperative game is deﬁned as a function c : 2X ! R for a nonempty
ﬁnite set X , which satisﬁes cð;Þ ¼ 0. A player of a cooperative game is an
element of X . For a set S  X of players, the value cðSÞ is regarded as a
minimum cost owed by the players of S when they cooperate.
A cooperative game is submodular (or concave ) if for any S; T  X the
inequality cðSÞ þ cðT Þ  cðS [ T Þ þ cðS \ T Þ holds. Submodularity can be
interpreted as follows. If the players of T n S make a coalition with S and S \ T ,
then the costs will increase by cðS [ T Þ  cðSÞ and cðT Þ  cðS \ T Þ, respectively.
Now, by submodularity, the setwithmore players (i.e., S than S \ T ) has the less
cost increase (i.e., cðS [ T Þ  cðSÞ  cðT Þ  cðS \ T Þ). This means that the set
with more players has potentially more incentive for other players to join, and
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we can see this is a natural condition in the real life. Also, in cooperative game
theory submodularity is known to possess some important properties. For
example, the core of a submodular game is nonempty, it is a unique von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern solution, and the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core
(when the degeneracy is taken into account) [16]. Moreover, in a submodular
game, the core and the bargaining set coincide and the kernel and the nucleolus
coincide [12]. In addition, the nucleolus and the s-value can be computed in
polynomial time for a submodular game ([11] and [18] respectively).
Refer to Bilbao [1] and Curiel [3] for cooperative game theory with
emphasis on combinatorial optimization games. Also, see Fujishige [9] for an
appearance of submodularity in the context of combinatorial optimization
and network ﬂows.
In this article, we investigate two kinds of combinatorial optimization
games associated with a graph G ¼ ðV ;EÞ. The minimum coloring game on a
graphG is a function vG : 2
V ! N deﬁned as vGðSÞ ¼ vðG½SÞ for S  V . Recall
that G½S is the subgraph of G induced by S. The minimum vertex cover game
on G is a function sG : 2E ! N deﬁned as sGðSÞ ¼ sððV ; SÞÞ for S  E. Here,
ðV ; SÞ is a subgraph of G ¼ ðV ;EÞ but is not necessarily an induced subgraph.
Our theorems are the following.
Theorem 1. The following are equivalent for a graph G ¼ ðV ;EÞ.
(A) The minimum coloring game vG is submodular.
(B) G contains no induced subgraph isomorphic to K1 [ K2. Here, K1 [ K2 is a
graph with three vertices a; b; c and one edge fa; bg.
(C) G is a complete r-partite graph.
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent for a graph G ¼ ðV ;EÞ.
(A) The minimum vertex cover game sG is submodular.
(B) G contains no subgraph isomorphic to K3 or P 3. Here, K3 is a complete
graph with three vertices, and P 3 is a path of length three (i.e., with four
vertices).
(C) Each connected component of G is a star. Here, a star is such a bipartite
graph that one partition class has exactly one vertex. We regard a graph
with one vertex as a star.
These theorems immediately imply that the problem deciding the sub-
modularity of minimum coloring games (and minimum vertex cover games,
respectively) on a given graph can be solved in polynomial time.
Remark that the problems deciding the balancedness (and the total-bal-
ancedness, respectively) of minimum coloring games and minimum vertex
cover games are investigated in Deng–Ibaraki–Nagamochi [4] (and Deng–
Ibaraki–Nagamochi–Zang [5], respectively).
2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First we show ðAÞ ) ðBÞ. That is, if G contains an induced subgraph
isomorphic to K1 [ K2, then vG cannot be submodular. To show this, we use
the fact that if H is an induced subgraph of G and vG is submodular, then vH
is also submodular. From this fact, it suﬃces to show that vK1[K2 is not
submodular. This is not so diﬃcult to show.
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Next we show ðBÞ ) ðCÞ. Since that G is complete r-partite is equivalent
to that all connected components of the complement G of G are complete
graphs, we show that if G has a component C which is not complete, then G
contains an induced subgraph isomorphic to K1 [ K2.
Let V ðCÞ be the vertex set of C. This claim is obvious if jV ðCÞj  2. So we
assume that jV ðCÞj  3. Since C is not a complete graph in G, there exist two
vertices a; b 2 V ðCÞ which are not adjacent in G. Then there must be a path
from a to b in G since C is a connected component of G. Let us denote
this path by v0; v1; v2; . . . ; vk1; vk, where a ¼ v0 and b ¼ vk. Here, put
i ¼ minfj 2 f1; . . . ; kg : a and vj are not adjacentg. Note that such an i
always exists because a and b are not adjacent and i cannot be 1. So
G½fa; vi1; vig is a path of length two in G. This means that G½fa; vi1; vig is
isomorphic to K1 [ K2 in G. Thus the claim has been shown.
Finally, we show ðCÞ ) ðAÞ. That is, if G is complete r-partite, then vG
is submodular. Let G ¼ ðV ;EÞ be complete r-partite and V1; V2; . . . ; Vr
be the partition classes of V . Here, for any S  V we have
vGðSÞ ¼ jfi 2 f1; . . . ; rg : Vi \ S 6¼ ;gj. Let us deﬁne a map p : 2V ! 2f1;...;rg as
pðSÞ ¼ fi 2 f1; . . . ; rg : Vi \ S 6¼ ;g. With this map, we can write
vGðSÞ ¼ jpðSÞj. Observe that the map p has the following properties for a
complete r-partite graph G: for any S; T  V
 pðS [ T Þ ¼ pðSÞ [ pðT Þ;
 pðS \ T Þ  pðSÞ \ pðT Þ:
Using these properties, we can prove the submodularity of vG as follows.
vGðSÞ þ vGðT Þ ¼ jpðSÞj þ jpðT Þj
¼ jpðSÞ [ pðT Þj þ jpðSÞ \ pðT Þj
 jpðS [ T Þj þ jpðS \ T Þj
¼ vGðS [ T Þ þ vGðS \ T Þ:
Thus we have completed the proof of Theorem 1.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 2
First we show ðAÞ ) ðBÞ. That is, if G contains a subgraph isomorphic to P 3
or K3, then sG is not submodular. Here, we use the fact that if H is a subgraph
of G and sG is submodular, then sH is also submodular. With this fact, it
suﬃces to show that neither sP 3 nor sK3 is submodular. This is not so diﬃcult
to show.
Next, we show ðBÞ ) ðCÞ. That is, if there exists a connected component
of G which is not a star, then G contains a subgraph isomorphic to P 3 or K3.
Let C be a connected component of G which is not a star. Consider the
case that C is not bipartite. Then C has a cycle of odd length. When this
length is three, this cycle is isomorphic to K3. When this length is ﬁve or more,
along this cycle we can ﬁnd P 3. Next consider the case that C is bipartite. In
this case, since C is not a star, we have P 3 as a subgraph of C. Thus, we have
shown ðBÞ ) ðCÞ.
Finally we show ðCÞ ) ðAÞ. That is, if every connected component of G is
a star, then sG is submodular.
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Let G ¼ ðV ;EÞ be a graph with every component being a star and
C1; . . . ;Cr be the connected components of G. Then for any S  E we have
sGðSÞ ¼ jfi 2 f1; . . . ; rg : EðCiÞ \ S 6¼ ;gj. Here, deﬁne a map p : 2E ! 2f1;...;rg
as pðSÞ ¼ fi 2 f1; . . . ; rg : EðCiÞ \ S 6¼ ;g. With this map, we can write
sGðSÞ ¼ jpðSÞj.
Observe that the map p has the following properties when every connected
component of G is a star: for S; T  E
 pðS [ T Þ ¼ pðSÞ [ pðT Þ;
 pðS \ T Þ  pðSÞ \ pðT Þ:
By these properties, we can show the submodularity of sG as in the proof of
Theorem 1.
This completes the whole proof of Theorem 2.
3 The Shapley value
The Shapley value is an important concept in cooperative game theory. First
we will deﬁne marginal contributions which are needed in the deﬁnition of the
Shapley value. Consider a linear order p on a ﬁnite set X with n elements.
Such an order has a one-to-one correspondence with a permutation p 2 Sn on
X , and we have n! possible linear orders. (Sn represents the set of all
permutations on a set with n elements.) For a linear order p, put
PpðiÞ ¼ fj 2 X : j p ig. Note that i 2 PpðiÞ. For a cooperative game
c : 2X ! R, we deﬁne the marginal contribution mcp½i 2 R of a player i 2 X
with respect to a linear order p as
mcp½i ¼ cðPpðiÞÞ  cðPpðiÞ n figÞ:
This means how much the cost increases due to the player i when the players
gather one by one according to the order p so as to form X . By the deﬁnition
of the marginal contribution, we have
Pfmcp½i : i 2 Xg ¼ cðX Þ for any
p 2 Sn.
The Shapley value uc½i 2 R of a player i 2 X for a cooperative game
c : 2X ! R is deﬁned as
uc½i ¼ 1
n!
X
p2Sn
mcp½i:
This means, the Shapley value uc½i of the player i is the expectation of the
marginal contributions mcp½i when a permutation p is chosen uniformly at
random from Sn. We can see that
Pfuc½i : i 2 Xg ¼ cðX Þ.
Symmetry is an important property of the Shapley value. Here, two
players i; j 2 X are said to be symmetric if for any S  X n fi; jg it holds that
cðS [ figÞ ¼ cðS [ fjgÞ. Here is a well-known lemma on symmetric players.
Lemma 1. For a cooperative game c : 2X ! R, the Shapley values of symmetric
players are equal: uc½i ¼ uc½ j for symmetric i; j 2 X .
In this section, we explicitly write down the formulae of the Shapley values
of submodular minimum coloring games and submodular minimum vertex
cover games. From these formulae, we can compute the Shapley values for
submodular minimum coloring games and submodular minimum vertex
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cover games. Note that generally it is NP-hard to compute the Shapley values
for minimum coloring games and minimum vertex cover games. Otherwise,
by computing
PfuvG ½i : i 2 V g ¼ vðGÞ (or PfusG ½i : i 2 Eg ¼ sðGÞ), we
could tell what was the chromatic number (or the size of a minimum vertex
cover, respectively) of G. However, computation of the chromatic number (or
the size of a minimum vertex cover) is known to be NP-hard [9].
3.1 The Shapley value for submodular minimum coloring games
From Theorem 1, the minimum coloring game vG is submodular if and only if
G is complete r-partite. In this subsection, we assume that G satisﬁes this
property. Let V1; . . . ; Vr be the partition classes of G. Then, we can see that
two vertices from the same partition class Vi are symmetric players. That is
because for v 2 Vi and S  V n fvg, vGðSÞ ¼ vGðS [ fvgÞ holds if S contains a
vertex of Vi, and otherwise vGðSÞ ¼ vGðS [ fvgÞ  1 holds, which does not
depend on the choice of v from Vi. Lemma 1 says that the Shapley values of
symmetric players are equal, so we are allowed to denote the Shapley value
of a player in Vi by ui.
Let us compute the Shapley value ui of a player v 2 Vi. First we ﬁx a linear
order p on the vertex set V and compute the marginal contribution mvGp ½v.
From the discussion above, we have
mvGp ½v ¼
1 ðPpðvÞ \ Vi ¼ fvgÞ
0 ðotherwiseÞ;

that is, mvGp ½v is 1 if v is the minimum of a linear order p restricted to Vi and
otherwise mvGp ½v is 0. Thus, the Shapley value ui is written as, with n ¼ jV j,
ui ¼ PrðPpðvÞ \ Vi ¼ fvg : p is chosen from Sn u.a.r.Þ
¼ Prðv p u for all u 2 Vi : p is chosen from Sn u.a.r.Þ
¼ 1jVij :
Here, ‘‘u.a.r.’’ means ‘‘uniformly at random’’.
3.2 The Shapley value for submodular minimum vertex cover games
By Theorem 2, the minimum vertex cover game sG is submodular if and only
if every connected component of G is a star. In this subsection, we assume
that G satisﬁes this property. Let C1; . . . ;Cr be the connected components of
G. Here, we can see that two edges from the same Ci are symmetric players.
From Lemma 1 symmetric players have the same Shapley value, so we write
ui for the Shapley value of a player from Ci.
Let us compute the Shapley value ui of e 2 EðCiÞ. First ﬁx a linear order
p on the edge set E and compute the marginal contribution msGp ½e. Similarly
to the case of the submodular minimum coloring games, we have
msGp ½e ¼
1 ðPpðeÞ \ EðCiÞ ¼ fegÞ
0 ðotherwiseÞ:

Therefore, the Shapley value ui is written as, with n ¼ jEj,
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ui ¼ PrðPpðeÞ \ EðCiÞ ¼ feg : p is chosen from Sn u.a.r.Þ
¼ Prðe p f for all f 2 EðCiÞ : p is chosen from Sn u.a.r.Þ
¼ 1jEðCiÞj :
4 Relationship with matroids
In this section, we state the relationship between Theorems 1, 2 and matroids.
For a detail of matroid theory, see Murota [13], Oxley [14] and so on.
A matroid is a pair ðX ; IÞ of a nonempty ﬁnite set X and a family I  2X
which satisﬁes the following conditions:
(I1) ; 2 I ;
(I2) T 2 I implies S 2 I for any S  T  X ;
(I3) for any S; T 2 I with jSj > jT j there exists i 2 S n T such that T [ fig 2 I .
An independent set of a matroid ðX ; IÞ is a member of I . For a matroid
ðX ; IÞ, we deﬁne a function q : 2X ! N as qðSÞ ¼ maxfjT j : T  S; T 2 Ig.
This function q is called the rank function of the matroid ðX ; IÞ. It is known
that the rank function of a matroid satisﬁes the following properties:
(R1) 0  qðSÞ  jSj for any S  X ;
(R2) qðSÞ  qðT Þ for any S  T  X ;
(R3) qðSÞ þ qðT Þ  qðS [ T Þ þ qðS \ T Þ for any S; T  X .
Conversely, if an integer-valued set function q : 2X ! N satisﬁes these three
conditions, then for a family I ¼ fI  X : jI j ¼ qðIÞg; ðX ; IÞ is a matroid. In
this sense, the properties (R1)–(R3) characterize a matroid.
Here, observe that vG satisﬁes the properties (R1)–(R3) if G contains no
induced subgraph isomorphic to K1 [ K2. The property (R1) is easy. The
property (R3) is Theorem 1 itself. The property (R2) follows from the next
lemma.
Lemma 2. For any S  V satisfying jV n Sj  1 and any v 2 V n S, it holds that
vGðSÞ  vGðS [ fvgÞ  vGðSÞ þ 1.
Proof. Let c : S ! f1; . . . ; kg be a minimum coloring of G½S, i.e.,
vðG½SÞ ¼ k. Then, construct a coloring c0 : S [ fvg ! f1; . . . ; k; k þ 1g of
G½S [ fvg as c0ðvÞ ¼ k þ 1 and c0ðiÞ ¼ cðiÞ for i 2 S. Hence,
vGðS [ fvgÞ  k þ 1 ¼ vGðSÞ þ 1.
On the other hand, let c0 : S [ fvg ! f1; . . . ; lg be a minimum coloring of
G½S [ fvg, i.e., vðG½S [ fvgÞ ¼ l. Then, construct a coloring
c : S ! f1; . . . ; lg of G½S as cðiÞ ¼ c0ðiÞ for all i 2 S. Hence,
vGðSÞ  l ¼ vGðS [ fvgÞ. u
Here, remark that vG satisﬁes the properties (R1) and (R2) for any graph
G. Moreover, vG satisﬁes the property (R3) if and only if G contains no
induced subgraph isomorphic to K1 [ K2 due to Theorem 1. Therefore, the
conditions in Theorem 1 are equivalent to that vG is the rank function of a
matroid.
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Then, what is a matroid ðV ; IÞ with the rank function vG when G
contains no induced subgraph isomorphic to K1 [ K2? An independent set is
a set I 2 I satisfying jI j ¼ vðG½I Þ. This means that I is a clique of G. That
is, if G contains no induced subgraph isomorphic to K1 [ K2 and we denote
the family of the cliques of G by I , then ðV ; IÞ is a matroid, and vice versa.
In general, a family satisfying the properties (I1) and (I2) is called a sim-
plicial complex or an independence system, and the family of the cliques of a
graph is a simplicial complex. In the past literature, this is called a clique
complex .
One of the most prominent feature of matroids is the validity of a greedy
algorithm, which ﬁnds a maximum weighted base. A maximal independent
set of a matroid is called a base of the matroid. It is known that all the bases
have the same size, i.e., if B1 and B2 are bases of a matroid, then jB1j ¼ jB2j.
Later on, we use the terminology of matroids (as independent sets, bases, . . .)
even for a simplicial complex which may not satisfy (I3). For a simplicial
complex ðX ; IÞ and a non-negative weight vector w 2 RXþ, we consider a
problem computing a maximum weighted base. More formally, the maximum
weighted base problem can be stated as
maximize
X
i2B
w½i
subject to B is a base of ðX ; IÞ:
It is known that this problem is related to matroids through the following
greedy algorithm. More precisely speaking, the following greedy algorithm
returns an optimal solution for any non-negative weight vector w 2 RXþ if and
only if the simplicial complex ðX ; IÞ is a matroid [7,15].
Algorithm: Greedy Algorithm
Input: a simplicial complex ðX ; IÞ and a non-negative weight vector w 2 RXþ;
Step 1: sort X ¼ f1; . . . ; ng so that w½1  w½2      w½n;
Step 2: S  ;;
Step 3: for i ¼ 1 to n do
Step 3-1: if S [ fig 2 I then S  S [ fig;
end of for
Step 4: return S.
Remark that if a simplicial complex ðX ; IÞ is a clique complex, then the
maximum weighted base problem corresponds to the maximum weighted
clique problem. What is known for arbitrary graph G is that the maximum
weighted clique problem is NP-hard [9]. Some details can be found in a text-
book of combinatorial optimization (like Cook–Cunningham–Pulleyblank–
Schrijver [2] or Korte–Vygen [10]).
Synthesizing the discussion above, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let G ¼ ðV ;EÞ be a graph and I be the family of all cliques of G.
Then the conditions in Theorem 1 are equivalent to the following statements.
1. ðV ; IÞ is a matroid.
2. For any non-negative weight vector w 2 RVþ, the maximum weighted clique
problem is solved by Greedy Algorithm.
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